Scottish Economy Watch

Banks and Scottish Independence, again!

Following some of the comments and responses to yesterday's post on the banks and Scottish independence, I feel I should write some more on the issue.

David Comerford makes the important point that I have ignored the process of 'subsidiarization' of foreign banks. He cites the recent talk in Edinburgh and Research Briefing paper from Angus Armstrong of the National Institute of Social and Economic Research. What Armstrong notes is that the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England are moving towards ensuring that

Banks operating in the UK market with headquarters outside of the border would be required to be subsidiaries with their own regulatory capital and reserves held at the Bank of England. If this makes resolution easier this may make support for foreign banks (including from an independent Scotland) operating in the UK easier in future.

Subsidiarization will make the provision of liquidity to banks in the rUK from an independent Scotland easier than I allowed in my first post. This is because while liquidity is, in principle, only provided to solvent banks, they may unknowingly be at risk of insolvency. The requirement of subsidiarization with regulatory capital and reserves held at the Bank of England would minimise the risk to the rUK taxpayer and so liquidity support from the Bank is more likely to be forthcoming.

But that says nothing about the provision of both liquidity and bail-out support in the event of insolvency to banks, Scottish and foreign, operating in Scotland.

Armstrong, in the same paper, notes

For a newly independent country with a high debt to GDP ratio the capacity to support the financial system will be limited. ....... To prevent capital flight savers and investors must believe their money will always be safe in an independent Scotland.

To secure this, Armstrong offers three options: a new Central Bank of Scotland; joining the eurozone monetary union; fiscal agreement between the UK and an independent Scotland. But it is clear from his paper that the first two are not politically feasible and bring economic costs. So that leaves us with a fiscal agreement between the UK and an independent Scotland. And that is precisely what I wrote would be required in my first post.

Comerford further suggests in the context of subsidiarization that RBS and Lloyds could capitalise their English operations under English rules. But why would they want to do this if an independent Scotland was as safe to operate as the rest of the UK?

But Comerford is right to suggest in this context that the scale of the activities in the financial services sector need not change with independence. What I and I believe the Treasury paper was concerned about is the loss of some HQ functions and quality jobs rather than wholesale relocations out of Scotland. That would be unlikely.

Finally, Comerford believes that

John Swinney is correct to say that the importance of financial services to the Scottish economy is smaller than its importance to the rUK economy (but specifically the London economy) and to say that the scale of the activities of the financial services sector need not change with independence.

But John Swinney was using the smaller share of financial services in Scottish GVA not to say that the scale of such activities would not change after independence but to imply that the sector is no more at risk than in rUK; that the capacity of an independent Scottish state to support the financial system would be no less than the rUK. The Treasury paper and Armstrong's paper clearly disputes that.

Yes, financial services are much more important to the London economy in GVA terms as well as scale of assets. But no one is suggesting that London is seeking independence. On the other hand with Boris at the helm ....... !

 

Banks and Scottish Independence

The new Scotland Analysis paper on Financial Services and Banking published by the UK Treasury today makes inter alia the point that in an independent Scotland

"The Scottish banking sector would be exceptionally large compared to the size of an independent Scotland's economy, making it more vulnerable to financial shocks than it is as part of the larger UK."

Scotland's Finance Secretary John Swinney's response, to an issue that I have raised in this blog, for example, here, seems to be two-fold.

First, new regulatory provisions since the financial crisis will prevent such crises from happening, as in this quote:

"The Treasury paper seems to be based on a flawed, outdated view of the world which takes no account of the substantial banking reforms which have been ongoing across Europe since 2008."

Secondly, even if such a crisis occurs again financial services are less important to Scotland than they are to the UK as a whole, as in this quote

"Assertions and claims about Scotland's financial sector are entirely misleading - in terms of share of GDP, in fact, financial services are actually smaller for Scotland at 8.3% than the UK at 9.6%. So, if the argument is about risk, then the risk is with the UK."

Both of these responses are facile and in serious error.

While regulatory reform of banking is welcome no one seriously believes that the risks of a serious banking crisis in the future are much reduced. Some such as Andy Haldane of the Bank of England believe progress in this regard will have only been achieved when the size of banks and UK banks in particular is reduced. Others, including this distinguished academic in the field, believe that banking crises are an ever-present risk in capitalist economies.

Secondly, when Andy Haldane talks about size he is not referring to value added but to the size of the assets, or loans and investments, of the bank. As we see in this chart from the new Treasury paper the current size of banking sector assets would be 12.5 times GDP in an independent Scottish state compared to just under 5 times GDP in the whole of the UK.

Implicit in John Swinney's use of the GVA figure is the belief that because the Scottish banks have much of their business located abroad, there would automatically be an international solution if there was a need for a bailout of the 'Scottish' banks. But this flies in the face of the experience in the banking crisis of 2008-09. It is worth recalling Governor of the Bank of England Mervyn King's comment that

"Banks live globally but die locally."

What John Swinney and the 'Yes' campaign need to do is to first of all accept that there would be issues for an independent Scotland given the asset size of its banking sector. Following a serious crisis some international solution could be possible but it will not be automatic as John Swinney seems to imply.

The 'Yes' campaign and the Scottish government need also to address some of the other issues raised by the Treasury report and noted by Robert Peston in his blog today.

First, it is not simply a question of whether the banking sector could be bailed out in the event of bank failure in an independent Scotland. There is also the question of whether banks would have access to sufficient liquidity from the Central Bank if commercial sources of finance dry up as they did following the collapse of Lehman's in September 2008 and the eurozone banking crisis in 2012. This would depend crucially on the currency arrangement adopted by the government of an independent Scotland. And if access to liquidity from the Bank of England is desired then this could only occur if an independent Scotland was a member of a formal sterling currency zone with all that would imply in terms of restrictions on Scottish government fiscal policy and bank regulation.

Moreover, if the financial markets believe that an independent Scottish government will not have as deep pockets, or have access to deep pockets, as the UK government, then they may be more reluctant to lend to the banks, or would charge higher rates. Borrowing costs for the Scottish banks could therefore be higher.

Taking such circumstances together the risk of the two main Scottish banks relocating their headquarters outside Scotland would clearly be high.

John Swinney's glib responses today in no way address any of these issues.

Good news on Scottish jobs, but why?

The latest labour market data published today reveal that conditions in the Scottish labour market continue to improve. In the quarter January to March unemployment fell by just under 7,000 to below the 200,000 mark to 199,000, or a rate of 7.3%. The chart below shows that unemployment is now faring better in Scotland than the UK.

What is striking about these latest jobs market data is the surge in employment in Scotland. Jobs rose by 54,000 in the first quarter of this year compared to a fall of 43,000 in the UK as a whole. This brings Scottish jobs performance since before the recession more into line with the UK as the following chart shows.

Scottish jobs are now -1.3% below their pre-recession peak, whereas in the previous quarter they were more than 3% below the pre-recession peak. This is still worse than the UK, where, despite the loss of jobs in the recent quarter the total is 0.6% above the pre-recession peak.

So what is going on here?

First, we cannot discount the possibility that the Scottish data reflect measurement or sampling error, more so than the UK data where samples are relatively bigger. The latest 'surge' may reflect a correction of earlier errors, or a large error in the latest measurement. Only later data will help clarify that.

Secondly, if we assume no measurement error, the explanation could be as follows.

Since the fourth quarter of 2009 when there was a large loss of jobs in Scotland, the Scottish jobs market has been weaker than the jobs market in the UK as a whole. Yet, GDP growth has been very similar in Scotland and the UK. On the face of it, that meant that productivity worsened more in the UK than Scotland. Again we also cannot discount measurement error affecting the GDP estimates both in Scotland and the UK. There may also be different industrial/structural reasons, including the relative number of 'zombie' firms in Scotland and the UK, which would affect the relation of employment to output in Scotland and UK - I assume that the contribution of such firms to GDP is much less than their contribution to employment, other things equal.

But setting all those possible explanations aside, maybe, just maybe, Scottish employers took a more pessimistic view of the course of the recession and recovery than their UK counterparts. Hence, employment was cut back here but nor in the UK. Now we may be seeing a correction as Scottish employers revise their expectations up considering that conditions are not as bad as they expected. Conversely, UK employers may be in the process of revising their expectations downward: the recovery is not as strong as they anticipated, hence cutback on employment.

Only a theory, but it does reconcile the different Scotland-UK jobs market behaviour with the similar output/GDP behaviour.

What do you think?

Sterling and Scottish Independence

There would be no "massive positive contribution" to the Sterling Zone's balance of payments following Scottish independence.

Now that the dust has settled after the publication this week of the Treasury's paper on currency and monetary policy options in an independent Scotland, it is time to stand back and reflect.

As you might expect there have been the usual exchanges between the 'Better Together' advocates and the 'Yes' campaign. And the frequent resort to ad hominem arguments.

My own view is that the Treasury paper provides a solid piece of analysis of the issues facing an independent Scotland. For those who don't accept my view then I would direct readers to the journalist Stephanie Flanders for a - perhaps too - balanced view and to the Oxford academic, and leading macroeconomist, Simon Wren Lewis's blog on the paper.

I have blogged extensively on the issue - e.g. here and here - and broadly my views coincide with the thrust of the Treasury paper.

The key points it seems to me are as follows:

• An independent Scotland would probably be better adopting sterling if it can get an agreement with the UK government. But that agreement would come with heavy restrictions on debt and fiscal policy that the Scottish government might find too onerous.
• A failure to get agreement would if the Scottish government persists with its desire to use sterling produce a 'dollarization' or 'sterlingisation' solution, which would be even less satisfactory for Scotland.
• Under 'sterlingisation' the Bank of England would set monetary policy and interest rates without consideration of Scottish economic conditions and very importantly the money supply in Scotland would be market driven. That means the money supply would principally be determined by what happens to the balance of payments: a deficit/surplus and the money supply contracts/expands. Hence, these variations in money supply would very likely not be appropriate for domestic economic conditions, or the preferred monetary policy stance of the Scottish government. Scottish fiscal policy would therefore have to do more. But that policy is likely to be very restricted not in this case by the UK government but by market constraints such as higher borrowing costs and the difficulties of borrowing effectively in a foreign currency - sterling.
• In these circumstances an independent Scottish currency might be the best option but while there would be benefits there would be a new set of costs to bear that are well documented in the Treasury paper.

The concerned reader might, therefore, ask whether retaining sterling as part of the UK union and dropping the idea of independence might be the first-best solution. This would be a good question, with which I would find difficult to disagree.

But wait!

The Scottish government and the 'Yes' campaign argue that talk of severe fiscal constraints imposed by a UK government as the price of a sterling currency union, or a failure to get agreement on a sterling union with the UK government, is highly unlikely because

Scotland's continued use of the pound would make a massive positive contribution to the Sterling Zone's balance of payments. For example, Oil and Gas UK estimate that North Sea oil and gas exports, the vast majority of which originate from Scottish waters, boosted the UK's balance of payments by £40 billion 2011-12.

In my view it is unlikely politically that no agreement would be secured with the UK government, at a price.

But is the Scottish government correct to argue that the benefits to the UK balance of payments of Scotland remaining in sterling are so large that the restrictions imposed by a UK government are unlikely to be onerous and could easily be accepted by the government of an independent Scotland?

I fear not.

The Scottish Government and the 'Yes' campaign are fostering a myth about the size of the loss to the continuing UK, or rUK, balance of payments in the event of Scottish independence and withdrawal from sterling.

My preliminary estimate is that the net cost to the rUK balance of payments would be £3.4 billion in 2011-12 not £40 billion. The table outlines the calculation.

What the Scottish government has chosen to ignore are the offsetting flows that favour sterling and the rUK balance of payments in the event of Scottish independence.

The most important ones are:

• the remittances abroad of north sea oil profits which because of the large foreign ownership of oil and gas production in the UKCS I estimate at £19 billion in 2011;
• Scotland had a deficit on its trade in goods and services in 2011 with rUK of £13 billion; this would provide a big boost to rUK balance of payments in the event of independence because currently trade within the UK falls outside the measure;
• Around 20 percent of Scottish GVA is produced by companies headquartered/registered in rUK so profits of these activities are remitted to the rest of UK and would enter the rUK balance of payment positively in the event of Scottish independence. I estimate the value of these to be £5.8 billion in 2011.

Taken together, the net deterioration in the rUK balance of payments following Scottish independence with a separate currency is £3.4 billion. This means that in 2011 the deficit on the rUK balance of payments would have been £23.6 billion rather than £20.2 billion. That represents a small deterioration in the deficit as a proportion of GDP of 0.2 percentage points from 1.3 percent to 1.5 percent.

The upshot of all this is that far from providing a major boost to the rUK balance of payments if an independent Scotland retained sterling, the effect is largely neutral.

There is little in this analysis to deny the contention of the Treasury paper that a formal sterling union following Scottish independence would "require rigorous oversight of Scotland's (fiscal) plans by continuing UK."

Scottish GDP improves

The latest Scottish GDP statistics, published today, for the fourth quarter of 2012, are on the face of it quite encouraging, especially when compared to UK.

The bald statistics show that GDP rose by 0.5% in Scotland in the quarter, while falling by -0.3% in the UK. However, growth in 2012 - calendar year - was at 0.3% identical in both Scotland and the UK.

The position of Scotland and the UK in terms of the recovery of GDP from recession is shown in the chart below.

Scottish GDP stands at -2.4% below its pre-recession peak, slightly better than the position of UK GDP, which is -2.9% below its pre-recession peak. So, still a long way to go before the economy gets back to where it was, in GDP terms in early 2008.

There are two key factors that are complicating the assessment of the GDP performance of Scotland and the UK, both absolutely and relatively, during 2012. The first is the differential impact of the London Olympics. The second is the consequences of declining oil and gas production.

To a certain extent the weak performance of the UK economy in quarter four was a reflection of the temporary boost given to GDP by the Olympics in quarter three. If we look at the growth in GDP between quarters two and four in Scotland and the UK, we see that Scottish GDP rose by 0.8% while UK GDP rose by 0.6%. So, when we smooth out the effect of the Olympics the performance of Scotland and the UK is much closer.

But then there is the complicating factor of oil and gas production which - offshore production - is included in the UK GDP data but not in the Scottish data. Removing oil and gas production gives us the following chart.

Now once declining oil and gas production is removed, which incidentally would have lowered measured GDP growth in an independent Scotland, we find that both Scotland and the UK grew by 0.8% between the second and fourth quarter. Scottish and UK growth is identical.

Once that is done, we see that UK GDP is -1.9% below its pre-recession peak compared to -2.4% for Scotland. So, we can conclude that the recovery continues to be weak in the UK and a little weaker still overall in Scotland.

One hope of the UK Government and many commentators is that the UK economy will recover from the Great Recession by re-balancing away from domestic demand to external or foreign demand, from consumption to investment, and from public to private production. A key factor in this is the desired shift in favour of manufacturing, which is a major exporter. The latest data show that very little progress is being made here as the next chart shows.

However, it is some small comfort that Scottish manufacturing is doing better than UK manufacturing. But the downturn in the fourth quarter in Scottish manufacturing as well as in UK manufacturing takes some of the shine off the good overall Scottish GDP performance in the fourth quarter.

Stronger signs of recovery in Scottish labour market

The latest Scottish labour market statistics published this morning serve further to reinforce the view that a more sustained recovery is now underway.

Employment during the quarter to Dec - Feb 2013 rose by 39,000, or 1.6%, and by 20,000 over the year, 0.8%. In the UK, employment was almost flat, falling slightly by just over two thousand. But over the year, the growth in UK jobs was strong than in Scotland, rising by 1.7%.

Despite this improvement, which is significant, jobs in Scotland are still -2.1% below their pre-recession peak, whereas in the UK jobs are 0.4% above their pre-recession peak. The Scottish jobs position is shown in the chart below

Unemployment fell in Scotland during the quarter by -11,000, or -5.2%. In the UK, in contrast, unemployment rose by 70,000, or 2.8%. The measured ILO unemployment rate is now 7.3% in Scotland compared to a much higher rate of 7.9% in the UK. Over the year, unemployment has fallen by -21,000, or -9.8%. In the UK the number unemployed fell by -71,000 over the year, or -2.7%, a much slower rate of decline than in Scotland.

One factor that has tended to flatter the Scottish unemployment figures compared to the UK has been the rise in the number of inactive workers, which has been stronger here. This has tended to depress the measured Scottish unemployment rate compared to the UK. However, in the most recent quarter the number inactive fell by -23,000, or -1.5%, whereas in the UK inactive numbers rose by more than 25,000, or 0.1%.

The fall in inactive numbers has reduced my estimate of the 'real' level of unemployment; see earlier blogs, as the chart shows

'Real' unemployment is now 55,000 higher, at 9.1%, than measured unemployment compared to 78,000, at 10.4% in the previous quarter.

The latest jobs and unemployment data are encouraging and taken with the latest GDP data, see forthcoming blog, do suggest that the Scottish economy is recovering if slowly from the recessionary period.

However, it is worth sounding a note of caution. From the latest data, to December 2012, it appears that full-time employment continues to fall, with jobs growth driven by the growth of the part-time and self-employed. As I noted here we can only be certain of a sustained recovery in the Scottish labour market when the number of full-time employees begins progressively to rise.

Scotland's Public Sector Net Debt

Yesterday the Scottish Government produced a paper where estimates are provided of Scotland's historical notional share of UK debt interest payments and public sector net debt.

The paper identifies UK public sector net debt at the end of 2011-12 as £1,100 billion, which amounted to 72% of UK GDP. Applying a per capita share to Scotland, produces an estimate for Scottish public sector net debt of £92 billion. This amounts to 62% of Scottish GDP, since with a geographical share of oil Scotland's GDP per capita is estimated to be greater than the UK.

One can accept this estimate provided one does not then conclude that the burden of debt in an independent Scotland is ten percent points lower than the UK. We cannot conclude this because, as I and others have noted, an independent Scotland will be faced with a higher interest rate on its long-term government borrowing than the UK.

More controversially, the Scottish Government's new paper goes on to estimate an illustrative historic share of UK net public debt. The Scottish Government describe this estimate of Scotland's net public debt as being based on:

estimates of public spending and tax receipts in Scotland over the past thirty years, in other words, on the basis of what Scotland has actually contributed to UK tax revenues

On this basis, the Scottish Government estimates Scotland's share of UK net debt to be £56 billion, equivalent to 38 per cent of GDP.

These estimates lead Deputy First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon to conclude that:

Both of the methodologies show that Scotland's estimated share of national debt takes up a smaller proportion of our economy than is the case for the UK - which means that in all circumstances Scotland will be better off with independence.

I have already noted that these estimates ignore the cost of borrowing, which is likely to be higher in an independent Scotland. But a moment's further thought should lead one to question the Scottish Government's illustrative historic calculation.

First, it seems a reasonable logical argument that as part of the United Kingdom Scotland should broadly be expected to share on a per capita basis in UK public spending, taxation and debt. Asking Scotland to take a per capita share of UK debt if Scotland decided to leave the UK union would seem to be reasonable, since everybody in the UK might be said to be in the same boat together.

However, the Scottish Government suggests that a historic calculation may be more appropriate. But in computing their 'historic' estimate they confine the calculation to the cumulated fiscal balance, including a geographic share of oil revenues, since 1980/81. This is then expressed as a ratio of the cumulative UK deficit over the same period (5.1%) and that ratio is taken to be Scotland's notional share of UK public sector net debt (£56 billion).

But if we are to compute Scotland's share of UK debt on an historic basis, shouldn't we also allow for special Scottish factors that directly affected the level of UK public net debt?

One obvious and significant omission is the bailout of the two Scottish banks in 2008-09.

The National Audit Office estimates that the amount of cash - requiring to be borrowed - for the bank bailout was £124 billion. The share of the two Scottish banks amounted to £67 billion. If we assume that a population share of this number is allowed for in the Scottish Government's 'historic' estimate, this leaves a further £57 billion to be added to the £56 billion debt estimated by the Scottish Government. £113 billion of debt amounts to 77% of Scottish GDP including a geographical share of oil value added.

The new estimate is shown along with the Scottish per capita estimate and the UK net public debt share in the following chart

On this basis and adjusting to gross debt figures as the Scottish Government do in their Chart 4, Scottish gross debt on an historic basis would rise from 44% to around 90%. This would raise Scotland in the debt EU-15 debt ranking from the Scottish Government's rank of 14th from 16 (adding Scotland to the EU-15) to 6th from 16.

This, and remembering the point about borrowing costs, certainly doesn't appear to support Nicola Sturgeon's contention "that in all circumstances Scotland will be better off with independence."

 

Scottish Tax and Spend

Today the Scottish Government published a two-page document providing a summary of trends in total Scottish tax receipts since 1980-81. The summary allocates to Scotland a geographical share of North Sea Oil revenues and draws from experimental statistics of Scotland's fiscal balance which are published on the Government Expenditures and Revenues Scotland (GERS) website here.

The data are not new. The fiscal balance estimates were updated for the GERS exercise to include 201-2 fiscal data and published on 5 March. Nevertheless, the Herald thought the information to be of sufficient importance to run the story as its main feature under the headline "New Report: Scots paying more tax than rest of UK" Given prominence in the story was a quote by Finance Secretary John Swinney from the government Press Release accompanying the report:

These figures confirm what we have known all along. Scotland more than pays her way in the UK. They show that the average tax receipt per person in Scotland has been higher in each of the last 30 years than it has been across the UK as a whole.

As the chart below shows John Swinney's comment is correct.

However, what was not reported in the Herald, wisely in my view, was John Swinney's further comment in the Press Release:

With the full control of our finances we could have invested this money for the people of Scotland, creating jobs and investing in public services.

The 'new report' does not contain any information on spending. An examination of the spending data on the same per capita basis as the tax data and taken from the GERS website reveals the following:

Yes, spending per person in Scotland has also been higher in each of the last 30 years than it has been across the UK as a whole.

So, broadly, these greater tax receipts were invested for the people of Scotland, creating jobs and investing in public services.

The Scottish people have received a significant dividend from North Sea oil revenues, much more than people in the rest of UK.

Now, it is clear that oil revenues were exceptionally high in real terms in the 1980s - as the tax receipts chart indicates. The Scottish people might legitimately note that the greater spending received in that period was much lower than the tax receipt surplus.

A sense of this can be gained from the final chart, which expresses per capita spending in Scotland and UK as a ratio of per capita tax receipts. This is really another way of expressing the fiscal balance data as I did in this post.

The large scale of oil revenues in the 1980s meant that Scotland would have been in surplus - ratio less than one. But from 1990 the spending to tax ratio has tended to be similar in Scotland as in the UK, in fact a little higher in Scotland at 1.11 compared to 1.10 in the UK.

So, if we are to talk about a country 'paying her way', we need to bring into account spending as well as revenues. Public spending per capita has averaged more than ten per cent (10.86%) higher in Scotland than in the UK since 1990/91, while tax receipts (including a geographic share of oil revenues) have averaged less than ten per cent (9.67%) higher in Scotland than in the UK since 1990/91.

With the independent Office of Budget Responsibility predicting (page 102 of its March Economic and Fiscal Outlook) a sustained decline in future oil revenues from £11.2bn in 2011-12 to £4.3bn in 2017-18, Scottish tax receipts are set to fall relative to the UK.

And of course I have not brought into this discussion the issue that an independent Scotland is likely to have to pay higher borrowing costs than the UK as I noted in this and this post. It is not just the size and relative size of a government deficit that matters.

Funding costs must also be considered.

Financial hotspots

Today the Herald contains a piece drawing on a report compiled by commercial think-tank Z/Yen - a tank of thinkers that has not crossed my doorstep before. The report according to the Herald reveals that:

GLASGOW has overtaken Edinburgh as Scotland's most important financial centre in the latest ranking of the world's economic hotspots. The biannual Global Financial Centres Index shows that Glasgow dropped 11 places to 50, but was still ahead of Madrid, Beijing and Bangkok. However, the Scottish capital slumped even further, down 17 spots to 54 in the list, a reflection of the turmoil that has swept through the Scottish banking centre in recent years

No information is given as the importance of each financial centre is measured and the criteria against which each are ranked, the source of the information and how statistically robust the data are.

There is no doubt that perceptions are important. But one test of the importance of a financial centre is the size of its contribution to output or value added and perhaps jobs. Value added does capture quality but the number of jobs less so.

The ONS produces sub-regional gross value added (GVA) data. In the latest release in December, the scale of finance and insurance activities in Glasgow and Edinburgh is readily identifiable. The chart below reveals the situation in 2010

That makes Edinburgh financial services more than 254% (2.5 times) larger than the GVA produced in the sector in Glasgow.

In jobs terms, financial and professional services employed 50,500 in Edinburgh and 37,500 in Glasgow.

Now clearly, these data are a little out of date but I find it difficult to believe that output and jobs have changed so rapidly in the last 18 months or two years to reverse the position in Glasgow relative to Edinburgh.

Neither city should be complacent in terms of perceptions of their international standing in financial services. And clearly, if perceptions turn against Edinburgh and Glasgow so that business is lost then value added and jobs will eventually fall.

But we should beware the declarations of commercial think tanks that do not publish the detailed data underpinnings of their so-called findings.

As Pa Entwhistle, and some say 'Oor Wullie's grandpa, used to say:

"Daft I call it!"

Whither full-time employment?

The latest labour market data for Scotland allow us to update the analysis of the composition or type of employment change.

The updated chart to Oct 2011-Sept 2012 is shown below

While these data lag the latest total jobs and unemployment data to Nov-Jan 2013, they offer a pretty stark reminder of the significant change in composition that lies beneath the overall employment numbers.

Full-time employment has been the main casualty falling by -7.2% from its pre-recession peak. Part-time and self-employment, in contrast, are +8.7% and +11.3%, respectively above their pre-recession heights.

While there are clearly structural changes occurring in the labour market on the demand side, with more workers expressing a preference for part-time and self-employment, the bulk of the change is largely driven by supply-side rather than demand side change. Put more simply this means that the switch is more a reflection of the wishes of firms hiring workers than the choice of workers themselves - see the STUC here.

I suspect we can only be certain of a sustained recovery in the Scottish labour market when the number of full-time employees begins progressively to rise.